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Rulemaking and the American Constitution
Peter L. Strauss 1
Abstract: A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it
difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts
resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President
is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the
regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of
authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that
permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. As is well known, rulemaking
employs distinct public procedures, and judicial review of the validity of the resulting
regulations is considerably more intense than would occur of the validity of legislation. The
working assumption, however, is that rulemaking decisions are made by particular agencies
responsible for the precise matters at issue, on the basis of what they expertly know and of the
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information and views they have received in the course of the public process. In recent decades,
presidential oversight of this process has steadily intensified. Former President Bush strongly
claimed a right not just of oversight, but of decision as the single politically elected official of
our executive branch. The result has been both to concentrate considerable power in one place,
in tension with American ‘checks and balances’ ideas, and to render rulemaking an increasingly
political rather than ‘expert’ activity. The paper explores these trends and conflicts.

When Professor Oliver was kind enough to invite me to join a conference on constitutional
impacts of the regulatory state, what I offered was to discuss the role of our President and
politics in regulatory rulemaking. One of the characteristics of the regulatory state – I am
confident in London, as well as in the United States – is its considerable reliance on
administrative officials, purportedly exercising expert judgment, to supplement statutory
provisions by the adoption of subsidiary legislation – regulations or rules, as we call them. One
kind of constitutional question, theoretically powerful at least since the days of John Locke, is
whether or at least under what conditions a legislature can even authorize this kind of activity by
executive actors. This is what is commonly called the question of the delegation of legislative
authority. Locke wrote that
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant
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and Institution, can be no other, than what the positive Grant conveyed, which being only to
make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their
Authority of making laws, and place it in other hands. 2
Our Supreme Court has often enough seemed to say the same thing, and just over half a
century ago it emphatically rebuked President Truman’s effort to avoid national calamity by
emergency action during the Korean War with the comment that ‘the President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker’. 3 Yet with only
two exceptions, both of which occurred in the early days of the New Deal, the Court has
resolutely refused to find unconstitutional Congress’s placement in administrative agencies of
the authority to adopt regulations that, if valid, have the full force of statutes. Although
frequently finding relatively constrained interpretations of the scope of such grants, as one means
of containing them, it has in effect denied that judicially administrable standards exist by which
to measure the validity of such delegations. Most recently, it has acknowledged that the
rulemaking they authorize involves the exercise of executive, not legislative, power. 4 It has in
effect celebrated the delegations, making clear that so long as the appearance of legality can be
2
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maintained it will accept them. Effectively, the only question for courts is whether an
administrative act is infra vires, not whether it can be permitted at all. If our President is not to
be a lawmaker, an agency can be.
This outcome can hardly be surprising. In the American legal system, as virtually all others,
one can observe a hierarchy of textual instruments created for and/or by the government, and
having the force of law or, if not quite that force, significant influence over how citizens and
corporations conduct their affairs. This hierarchy might be depicted in the following way:

One Constitution ratified by ‘the people’
Hundreds of statutes enacted by an elected Congress
Thousands of regulations adopted by politically responsible executive officials
Tens of thousands of interpretations and guidance documents issued by responsible bureaus
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding generated by individual bureaucrats

Yet familiar as this pattern may be, it must be evident that there is considerable tension between
our acceptance of it and the proposition that the President, responsible for execution of the laws,
is not to be a lawmaker. And that tension became virtually unbearable in the framework of the
strong ‘unitary President’ idea advanced by President Bush and Vice President Cheney during
the administration that has now thankfully drawn to a close. That idea, as you probably know, is
that the President is entitled to be ‘the decider’, not merely an overseer, of matters that the



Congress may have committed to the responsibility of any administrative agency. While there
are considerable differences to a Prime Minister’s role in parliamentary systems, my sense is that
the frequent intransitivity of regulatory statutes in such systems as well as in ours – so that
parliaments, too, create lawmakers as much as they do laws – must have real consequences for
those legal systems, as well as for ours, concerning one’s ideas about constitutionalism and the
‘rule of law’ in the regulatory state. So this is what I mean to talk about here.

Distinguishing Between Politics and Law in the American Administrative State
The American Constitution radically separates executive and legislative authorities in a
manner quite strange to parliamentary systems of government. Under the Constitution, the
American Congress has no responsibility for rulemaking beyond its creation by statute of legal
authority for executive actions (such as rulemaking), its provision of budgetary support for
government actions, its power to countermand regulations by statute, 5 and its informal oversight
of agency actions through investigative hearings and the like. Members of Congress, like any
member of the public, may attempt to influence rulemaking outcomes by commentary; but once
they have authorized rulemaking to occur, its fruition as a legal matter is strictly an issue for the
5
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executive. And the Constitution is explicit that members of Congress are forbidden to hold
executive office. Thus, the difference between the second and third levels of the hierarchy
sketched above is quite dramatic. Congress legislates; but rulemaking is an executive activity. 6
Analysts from parliamentary systems draw a distinction between ‘political’ and
‘administrative’ (or bureaucratic) controls of regulatory bodies. They tend to ascribe ‘political’
control to the parliament, and ‘administrative’ control to executive actors, who are understood in
a more technical than political sense. This is natural in a system in which ministerial and
legislative terms of office are interdependent, and only legislators are elected (even if it may be
known in advance which person or persons, if elected with majority legislative support, will
assume executive office). In parliamentary systems, moreover, executive governance may
usually be imagined as somewhat collegial in character; a ‘prime’ minister’s government
depends on continuing consensus among all ministers and the support of the legislators who
have elected her.
This interdependency with the legislature and this collegial character of the executive are not
to be found in the United States. Our President and the members of Congress are separately
elected, in each case to fixed terms of office. These terms do not coincide – two years for the
6
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House of Representatives, six years for the Senate, four years for the President. These terms are
also rigorous; the government does not fall on a vote of no confidence. The President is the
solitary elected executive official. 7 While his appointments to the highest positions of leadership
in the various government departments and agencies require senatorial approval, these persons,
once appointed, are answerable only to him; unless Congress uses the stringent process of
impeachment, it cannot participate in the removal of any executive official from office, from the
President on down. It cannot require senatorial approval of Presidential removals. Political
realities do offer some protection, since a President will know that he must secure Senate
confirmation of the successor to any person he removes from office. Nonetheless, a cabinet
secretary or agency head understands that her continuation in office depends on a President who,
in general, can remove her at any time, for any reason, without recourse. 8 The result is to make
7

The Vice President is also elected, of course, but not independently; he or she is a fixture of the

ballot for President, and election follows automatically from the President’s. The Vice President
may preside in the Senate and has a casting vote in the event of a tie, but has no constitutionally
defined executive responsibilities beyond availability to assume the presidency if required.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress has validly provided that agency heads
can be removed only ‘for cause’. The effective meaning of this constraint has never been tested.



executive control of administrative actions such as rulemaking ‘political’ as well as
‘administrative’.
One consequence is to dramatize the placement of administrative law, from an American
perspective, on the difficult and evanescent boundary between politics and law. One can find
this already expressed in the earliest of our great constitutional cases, Marbury v Madison, which
established the principle that American courts can review legislation to determine its
constitutionality. 9 In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion famously established the place
of the courts in the constitutional order. In the course of his opinion, he sought to distinguish
between governmental acts that a court might control by law, and others that were not subject to
judicial constraint. He denied any possibility of judicial review over acts that the President was
entitled to command from his subordinates. When an official
is to conform precisely to the will of the President [h]e is the mere organ by whom that
will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable

In any event the President would be the one to determine that ‘cause’ existed. His determination
could be challenged only in the courts, which would be very likely to defer to any credible
explanation. The finding that cause exists does not, and constitutionally could not, require
congressional approval.
9
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by the courts. . . . The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 10
In the particular case, the official in question was the Secretary of State, and Chief Justice
Marshall was drawing a contrast between the administration of foreign affairs (a question in its
nature political) and another responsibility of the Secretary of State at the time, to deliver
commissions for certain public offices (not a political question, but a matter in which the officer
had a legal right).
Are American courts then precluded from reviewing any governmental acts in which the
executive has some ‘discretion’? No. Few if any American analysts would describe decisions
about air quality made by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 11 in
10

11

Ibid 166, 170 (emphasis added).
The EPA is an executive agency that is not an element of any cabinet department. Headed by

a single Administrator whose appointment requires Senate confirmation and who serves on
presidential sufferance, EPA’s responsibilities are almost entirely regulatory, and not political in
the sense Chief Justice Marshall was expressing. Cabinet departments, headed by Secretaries,
often mix regulatory and political responsibilities; the regulatory activities are often assigned to



the way Chief Justice Marshall describes decisions of the Secretary of State about foreign affairs.
The Secretary of State is exercising discretion in its largest sense, one might say
DISCRETION!, in contexts for which there is no law to apply and which ‘can never be
examinable by the courts’. The great Chief Justice did not have in mind ‘discretion’ such as the
EPA Administrator is given by statute to decide mixed questions of law and politics. Issues like
his determinations about necessary air quality are the everyday focus of administrative law;
courts review these determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ under our federal Administrative

internal subdivisions, also headed by presidentially-appointed administrators, whose
responsibilities, like EPA’s, are almost entirely regulatory. Examples would include the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor, and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the Department of Transportation. Independent
regulatory commissions like the SEC, too, have responsibilities that are almost entirely
regulatory. The statements in this text, unless otherwise noted, apply to every actor of this kind
– EPA, FDA, OSHA, FAA, or SEC. Those interested in a primer on these different agency
structures may wish to consult PL Strauss, Administrative Justice in the United States (2nd edn,
2002) 127-35; see also n 45 and accompanying text below.



Procedure Act. 12
Indeed, we would say that for these acts, the possibility of effective judicial review to justify
their legality is essential. It is generally expressed as a sine qua non of their constitutionality.
That is, the ability of the courts to say whether the Administrator’s acts are infra vires is the
necessary condition of a valid delegation to her of the authority to act. Generally we assume that
such agency determinations reflect objective judgment about general propositions of fact (as, for
example, what is the degree of hazard posed to human life by given quantities of ozone in the
atmosphere) rather than simple political will. If standards did not exist permitting a court to
assess the legality of the Administrator’s decisions and acts concerning these matters, we would
say an unconstitutional delegation had been made. 13 These are not matters to be decided by
12

5 United States Code (USC) s 706(2)(A).
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See, eg, Ethyl Corp v EPA 542 F 2d 1, 68 (US Ct of Apps (DC Cir), 1976) (Leventhal, J,

concurring) (‘Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly – and courts
have upheld such delegation – because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises
the delegated power within statutory limits’.); Skinner v Mid-Atlantic Pipeline Co 490 US 212,
218; 109 S Ct 1726, 1731 (1989) (‘[S]o long as Congress provides an administrative agency with
standards guiding its actions such that a court could ascertain whether the will of Congress has
been obeyed, no delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principle of separation of



politics, and they are questions examinable by the courts.
There are, indeed, many respects in which the techniques of American rulemaking facilitate
these propositions. As a general matter, agencies engaged in rulemaking must make available to
the public, in advance, the data available to them on the basis of which they expect to act, and a
suggestion what it is they propose to do. They must then receive public comment on their
proposal. In subsequently acting, they must provide a reasoned explanation of the conclusions
they have reached, which in practice must include an explanation of any departure from
important commentary they may have received. 14 Not one of these propositions would be true in
the legislative context. Should review of the legality of an agency’s action then be sought, it will
be assessed not just in terms of the Constitution, but also of compliance with required procedure,
of fit with statutory authority, and of reasonable exercise of judgment within that authority, given
the relevant facts and views. No such ‘hard look’, 15 as it is often described, is called for when

powers has occurred’. (internal quotations omitted)).
14

5 USC s 553. Increasingly, this process and the documents associated with it may be

followed, and submissions to it may be made, on the Internet, <www.regulations.gov>.
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This term originated in decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia, which – sitting in the nation’s capital – has a high concentration of administrative law
business (it is, however, a generalist court like the other circuit courts of appeal, and not an



the constitutionality of legislation is challenged.
Thus, to take an example well known to American students of administrative law, the Clean
Air Act tasks the EPA with identifying and regulating sources of air pollution ‘which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare’. 16 Exercising this authority with
respect to coal-burning power plants in the late 1970’s, EPA imposed ceilings on allowable
emissions of sulphur dioxide and particulate matter. After conducting some preliminary
analysis, the agency published a proposed rule, a call for public comment, and a summary of
background information and studies – material totaling 30 pages – in the Federal Register, a
daily official publication of administrative and Presidential documents. 17 Over the next three

American Conseil d’Etat). The case described in the next paragraph of text is a good example of
its work. The Supreme Court effectively ratified the ‘hard look’ approach in a case faulting an
agency for failure to consider all the alternatives and collect additional data, see Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co 463 US 29, 103 S Ct
2856 (1983). In the words of an EPA attorney, courts will ‘inquire into the minute details of
methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure and will send the regulations back if these are
lacking’. WF Pedersen, ‘Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking’ (1976) 85 Yale LJ 38, 60.
16
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42 USC s 7411(b)(1)(A).
Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources,



months, the agency received more than 625 comments and held a hearing; six months later, it
issued a final rule, incorporating certain modifications. 18 EPA announced the new regulation
and set forth in detail the reasoning behind it, including responses to public comments, in a 45page entry in the Federal Register. When challenges to the new rule were filed (by both
environmental and industry groups), the reviewing court devoted 103 pages of opinion text to
the adequacy of EPA’s procedures and the reasonability of its conclusions in light of the relevant
data and statutory concerns. 19 By contrast, had the same standard been set by legislation,
judicial review for constitutionality would have entailed nothing more than a query, virtually
always answered in the affirmative, whether Congress’s action could in any rational way be
thought to serve a legitimate governmental end. 20

Electric Utility Steam Generating Units’ 43 Federal Register (Fed Reg) 42,154 (19 September
1978).
18

Environmental Protection Agency, ‘New Stationary Sources Performance Standards; Electric

Utility Steam Generating Units’ 44 Fed Reg 33,580, 33,598 (11 June 1979).
19

Sierra Club v Costle 657 F 2d 298 (US Ct of Apps (DC Cir), 1981).

20

Eg, Williamson v Lee Optical 348 US 483, 75 S Ct 461 (1955). The situation would be

different if issues of individual right were involved – if the legislation, say, discriminated on the
basis of race, gender, or religion – but that point need not concern us here.



What Role for the American President?
To what extent, then, is our President entitled to command, as a political matter, outcomes
whose determination Congress has entrusted to an administrative agency like the EPA? How far
down into the structure of government do political operatives penetrate? At what point is the
work of government done by a permanent civil service that may act under political supervision,
yet has ‘administration’ rather than ‘politics’ as its guiding light? Over the past few decades,
two trends have emerged in American administrative law: a growing reliance on rulemaking to
elaborate the detailed (but often quite significant) elements of regulation, as well as a steadily
increasing insistence by American Presidents on political penetration of the agency apparatus
and political control of its products.
The increased use of rulemaking is, from one perspective, a natural consequence of our
increased awareness of social interdependence and environmental hazard. At the same time as
human existence has come to involve more artificial elements of uncertain long-term effect, we
have developed greater technological capacities to discern and evaluate risk. The great increase
in rulemaking occurred, precisely, at the time of the great outpouring of health, safety and
environmental legislation in the United States that marked the 1960’s and 1970’s. Whatever the
Nineteenth Century’s contributions to global warming, industrial disease, and other ills, the



people of that time had fewer tools with which to detect them (and, perhaps, more immediate and
evident hazards to which to respond). The judgments we want to reach in consequence of our
growing knowledge about and sensitivity to risk – to continue one example already mentioned,
how much ozone is safe to permit in the atmosphere we breathe – involve too much detail to be
entrusted to the vote of an elected, generalist legislature’s politicians. Inevitably, as the
pyramidal figure opening this essay may suggest, we expect political legislatures to set general
standards for determinations of this sort, and to leave it to experts – i.e., administration – to find
the precise levels for particular substances, like ozone, that those standards make appropriate.
The severance of executive from legislative function in the United States (or, to put it another
way, the political irresponsibility of American legislators for rulemaking’s particular outcomes)
introduces a reinforcing temptation to rely on rulemaking – one that is much celebrated in the
American scholarship on ‘public choice’. The only political necessity for Congress to earn
public credit for ‘action’ is to appear to have dealt with a problem. It need not actually have
done as much as it might have by way of political resolution of issues. It can then point the
finger of blame elsewhere should things not work out so well. In consequence, some of the work
that ideally ought to be politically resolved, at the second level of the hierarchy above, is passed
on to the third.
We have discovered no effective corrective for this institutional failure. The logical



candidate would be a constitutional limitation on Congress’s power to confer authority on
executive government. 21 As already indicated, however, the rubric of the ‘delegation’ doctrine
suffices only to prevent the conferring of DISCRETION! in contexts where courts will conclude
that they must be in a position to determine the legality of government behaviour – that is, where
they will conclude that for executive power to be tolerated, there must be law to apply.
Government lawyers thus rarely argue in any administrative context that judicial review is
unavailable, but instead work to persuade the courts that agency behaviour meets the constraints
of legality.
While there thus must be ‘intelligible standards’ to which government actors may be held, 22
21

Implicit in this account is a fact about our Constitution: it does not define the government of

the United States, but rather only the three principal heads of authority: Congress, President, and
Supreme Court. Definition of all the rest – cabinet departments, lower courts, independent
agencies, even the precise size of the Supreme Court – is left to statutory determination by
Congress under its general authority to enact any statutes ‘necessary and proper’ to accomplish
the Constitution’s ends. US Const art I, s 8. See PL Strauss, ‘The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch’ (1984) 84 Columbia L Rev 573.
22

JW Hampton, Jr, & Co v United States 276 US 394, 409; 48 S Ct 348, 352 (1928) (‘If

Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body



the test for their existence is extremely permissive. One may almost say that it suffices for the
government to acknowledge the need to demonstrate legality under the governing statutes. 23
Our courts have lamented that they lack a judicially manageable standard for identifying

authorized to [set standards] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power’.).
23

In State of South Dakota v United States Dept of Interior 69 F 3d 878 (US Court of Apps (8th

Cir), 1995), the government argued before the Eighth Circuit court of appeals that the court
lacked power to review a decision of the Secretary of the Interior in a matter involving
permission to an Indian tribe to conduct gambling operations on its reservation, because the
statute authorizing that decision conferred DISCRETION! on the Secretary. Thus, the
government argued, there was no law to apply. Ibid 881. Astounded, the court then held that the
statute was an unlawful delegation of authority. Ibid 885. The case was taken to our Supreme
Court and, while it was pending, government lawyers informed that Court that the Secretary had
now concluded that there was law to apply, and that the lower court could effectively review the
challenged decision for its legality. Without hearing argument, the Supreme Court vacated the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion and remanded the matter to it for the review that had now been
conceded to be proper. Dept of Interior v South Dakota 519 US 919, 117 S Ct 286 (1996).



legislative insufficiencies. 24 Rather than tell Congress that it had not legislated sufficiently,
they work hard to find the ‘intelligible standard’ that is the coin of a valid delegation of
lawmaking authority, which then permits them to assess the legality of agency action. Yet this
review necessarily accepts broad scope for agency discretion on issues that courts are illequipped themselves to decide (eg, the health or environmental consequences of various
concentrations of ozone).
So the resulting regulation embodies a judgment that at the same moment:
·

has high social consequence (the choice of one rather than another ozone level may have
tremendous economic and other effects on various elements of society);

·

has an objective character suggesting the appropriateness of expert determination, but in
actuality is incapable of a single ‘correct’ resolution and thus requires significant
elements of scientific ‘judgment’;

24

See, eg, Whitman v American Trucking 531 US 457, 474-75; 121 S Ct 903, 913 (quoting

Mistretta v United States 488 US 361, 416; 109 S Ct 647, 678 (1989) (Scalia, J, dissenting))
(‘[W]e have “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible
degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law”’.); Mistretta
488 US at 415,109 S Ct at 677 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (noting that ‘the doctrine of
unconstitutional delegation . . . is not an element readily enforceable by the courts’).



·

is subject to effective judicial review to only a limited degree;

·

cannot be laid politically at the feet of Congress or the political party that at the moment
may hold the balance of power there; and

·

although ostensibly reached by an expert agency (the EPA), might be laid politically at
the feet of the President, who appointed the head of the EPA, and who will have his own
general concerns about regulatory affairs.

One then readily understands how, as the uses and impacts of rulemaking have increased,
Presidents have increasingly sought to bring it under their unitary and political control. They
have sought to bring politics and will to bear where the governing assumptions are that the
exercise of such authority is rationalized by its being an act of judgment.
Oversight or Decision?
In its most extreme form, growing in popularity over recent years and characterizing the
administration of the most recent President Bush, the claim is that in creating a single, ‘unitary’
executive, our Constitution entitles the President ultimately to decide any matter Congress has
made the responsibility of an executive agency. 25 This is a proposition I have addressed at
25

Representative positions taken in the contemporary literature: Constitution confers

decisional authority: see, eg, SG Calabresi and SB Prakash, ‘The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws’ (1994) 104 Yale LJ 541, 549-50; CS Yoo, SG Calabresi, and AJ Colangelo, ‘The



length in another place, 26 and it may be helpful here to summarize the arguments made there.
Our Constitution itself is at best ambivalent on the question. On the one hand, the opening
words of Article II, which addresses the executive power, place it simply in the President, and
the Philadelphia convention famously and emphatically rejected any idea of a collegial
executive. 27 Those who argue most strongly for presidential authority find in these words a

Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004’ (2005) 90 Iowa L Rev 601, 730; Constitution
does not confer decisional authority, but it should be presumed Congress intends it, given
the realities of modern administration: see, eg, E Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’ (2001)
114 Harvard L Rev 2245, 2251; L Lessig and CR Sunstein, ‘The President and the
Administration’ (1994) 94 Columbia L Rev 1, 2-3; the President, unless directly authorized, is
only an overseer: see, eg, CR Farina, ‘The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World’ (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 987, 987-89; KM Stack, ‘The President’s
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws’ (2006) 106 Columbia L Rev 263, 267; PL Strauss,
‘Presidential Rulemaking’ (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 965, 984-86.
26

PL Strauss, ‘Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law’ (2007) 75

George Washington L Rev 696.
27

See Strauss (n 21 above) 599-602.



placement in the President’s hands of the power to decide any matter assigned to the executive
branch. On this view, when Congress assigns a matter for decision to a constituent element of
the executive branch, it does so only for convenience; as a matter of constitutional power, the
President has the right to decide it. 28 On the other hand, the Constitution twice refers to ‘duties’
or ‘powers’ assigned to other officers. 29 While Article II unambiguously makes the President
‘Commander in Chief’ of the armed forces, the only authority it gives the President in relation to
domestic officers is the right to seek from them a written opinion about their exercise of those
duties. It does not say he may command their exercise of the duties assigned to them. 30 The
28

See, eg, Calabresi and Prakash (n 25 above); Yoo, Calabresi, and Colangelo (n 25 above).

29

US Const art I, s 8, cl 18 confers on Congress the authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be

necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof’; US Const art
II, s 2, cl 1 provides that the President ‘may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices’.
30

Ibid (The President ‘may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the

executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices’.)
(emphasis added).



final passages of Article II state that the President is responsible to see to it that the laws ‘be
faithfully executed’ 31 – i.e., as if by others. From this perspective, as some (but not all)
Attorneys General have concluded, 32 when Congress creates duties in others, that act creates in
31

Ibid s 3, cl 3 (emphasis added).

32

The contrast often given in the literature is between the advice of Attorney General Wirt to

President Monroe that
[the President’s role is to give] general superintendence [to those to whom Congress
had assigned executive duties, as] it could never have been the intention of the
constitution . . . that he should in person execute the laws himself. . . . [W]ere the
President to perform [a statutory duty assigned to another], he would not only be not
taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating them
himself.
‘The President and Accounting Officers’ 1 Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the
United States (Op Att’y Gen) (1823) 624, 624-25, and the advice of Attorney General Cushing
to President Pierce that
no Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the
President, [because a contrary view would permit Congress so to] divide and transfer the
executive power as utterly to subvert the Government, [albeit that] all the ordinary



the President constitutional obligations not only to oversee, but also to respect, their independent
exercise of those duties. Just as he must respect a statutory framework that assigns care for the
national parks to the Department of the Interior, and care for the national forests to the
Department of Agriculture, on this view, he must respect a statutory framework that assigns
actual decision-making about particular issues affecting air quality to the EPA; he is entitled
only to his (inevitably political) oversight.
Of course the difference between oversight and decision can be subtle, particularly when the
important transactions occur behind closed doors and among political compatriots who value
loyalty and understand that the President who selected them is their democratically chosen
leader. Nonetheless, a subordinate’s understanding whether what she owes the President is
simply respect and political deference, on the one hand, or law-compelled obedience, on the

business of administration [is, in statutory terms, placed under the authority of the
Departments, not the President, and] may be performed by its Head, without the special
direction or appearance of the President.
‘Relation of the President to the Executive Departments’ 7 Op Att’y Gen (1855) 453, 469-71
(emphasis in original). These opinions, with helpful commentary, may be found in HJ Powell,
The Constitution and the Attorneys General (1999) 29-34, 131-48; see also HH Bruff, Balance of
Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State (2006) 456-59.



other, has in my judgment important implications for what it means to have a government under
laws. I cannot improve on the characterization of the problem given half a century ago by
Professor Corwin:
Suppose . . . that the law casts a duty upon a subordinate executive agency eo nomine,
does the President thereupon become entitled, by virtue of his ‘executive power’ or of his
duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to substitute his own judgment for
that of the agency regarding the discharge of such duty? An unqualified answer to this
question would invite startling results. An affirmative answer would make all questions
of law enforcement questions of discretion, the discretion moreover of an independent
and legally uncontrollable branch of the government. By the same token, it would render
it impossible for Congress, notwithstanding its broad powers under the ‘necessary and
proper’ clause, to leave anything to the specially trained judgment of a subordinate
executive official with any assurance that his discretion would not be perverted to
political ends for the advantage of the administration in power. At the same time, a flatly
negative answer would hold out consequences equally unwelcome. It would, as Attorney
General Cushing quaintly phrased it, leave it open to Congress so to divide and transfer
‘the executive power’ by statute as to change the government ‘into a parliamentary
despotism like that of [Venice] or Great Britain with a nominal executive chief . . .



[utterly powerless].’ 33
My own conclusion then, is that in ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress
has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of
judicial review, the President’s role – like that of the Congress and the courts – is that of
overseer and not decider. 34 Our Constitution explicitly gives us a unitary head of state, but it
leaves the framework of government almost completely to congressional design. Given a
choice between President as overseer of the resulting assemblage, and President as
necessarily entitled ‘decider’, the implicit message is that of oversight, not decision.
Congress’s arrangements of government are a part of the law that the President is to assure
will ‘be faithfully executed’, and the Constitution’s text anticipates that those arrangements
33

ES Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957 (4th revised edn, 1957) 80-81

(quoting the opinion of Attorney General Cushing cited in n 32 above) (emphasis in Corwin). If
‘parliamentary despotism’ seems a counterintuitive descriptor of Great Britain with its Queen or
Venice with its Doge, it is important to bear in mind the context in which the term appears:
Attorney General Cushing’s point is that in these examples the chief of state had come to be a
figure-head with no genuine authority, such that the legislature effectively wielded undivided
power.
34

See, for example, Strauss (nn 25 and 26 above).



will place ‘duties’ elsewhere in the executive branch, which Congress is given wide scope to
define. The size and ambition of contemporary government, in a country dedicated to the
rule of law and resolute to defend itself against unchecked individual power, point in the
same direction. Congress can, to be sure, give the President decisional authority, and it has
sometimes done so. In limited contexts – foreign relations, military affairs, coordination of
arguably conflicting mandates – the argument for inherent presidential decisional authority is
stronger. But in the ordinary world of domestic administration, where Congress has
delegated responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created, that delegation is
a part of the law whose faithful execution the President is to assure. 35 Oversight
35

Illustrative of the stronger view of President Bush’s administration is a statement he issued on

signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, which contained a statutory
provision explicitly requiring a search warrant to open domestic first class mail:
The executive branch shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by
subsection 1010(e) of the Act, which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail
otherwise sealed against inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent
permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such as to
protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need for physical
searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence collection.



responsibilities, in my judgment, satisfy the undoubted constitutional specification of a
unitary chief executive, while avoiding the executive tyranny horn of Corwin’s dilemma.

An Increasingly Unitary Executive (?)
Of course it would rarely be the President himself who commands, but a political apparatus
operating under his immediate control. Recent years have seen both a significant expansion of
that apparatus in the White House itself, and much enlarged penetration of ‘political clearances’
into agency bureaucracies. 36 From the administration of President Ford (1974-77) forward,

That is, as he had inherent authority to act to protect the nation, the statutory provision could be
ignored. ‘Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 6407’ 2006 United States
Code Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN) S76, S77 (20 December 2006).
(‘H.R.’ as used here and throughout is an abbreviation for House of Representatives designating
bills originating in that chamber of Congress.)
36

‘[T]he number of full-time political appointees serving in the federal government [in policy

positions] jumped from 2150 in 1964 to 3687 in 1992. . . . These [positions, with 2300 others
effectively open to political clearance] . . . dwarf, by orders of magnitude, the number of political
appointees available to the executive leaders of most European nations’. DJ Barron, ‘From
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization’ (2008)



Presidents have created increasingly stringent mechanisms for oversight of agency rulemakings
likely to have a significant economic impact. These particular mechanisms, cantered in the
Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) of the President’s Office of Management
and Budget, will be discussed further below. Here, one should remark that OIRA’s controls are
professional and bureaucratic, at least in comparison with those of other White House offices.
Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh’s groundbreaking account of the EPA-White House
interface from the perspective of EPA political appointees dramatically illustrates the number of
White House voices (in both Republican and Democratic administrations) purporting to exercise
‘presidential control’; 37 Elena Kagan, now Solicitor General of the United States, recounted at
length her experience of presidential direction of agency rulemaking during the Clinton
administration, without ever focusing on OIRA’s work. 38
The increasing scope of political clearance for persons having policy responsibilities has
attracted rather less attention, but certainly renders American ‘administration’ more political
than would be expected in the strong civil service regimes of many parliamentary democracies.

76 George Washington L Rev 1095, 1123.
37

LS Bressman and MP Vandenbergh, ‘Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the

Practice of Presidential Control’ (2006) 105 Michigan L Rev 47, 47-52.
38

Kagan (n 25 above).



Probably the move in this direction began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, when a reform
of the civil service laws created in the upper echelons of the civil service a Senior Executive
Service, those persons responsible for policy direction and other matters involving substantial
discretion. In the United States as in European democracies, important federal bureaus, elements
perhaps of a cabinet department, might be under the direction of senior civil servants, permanent
government employees rather than political appointees. 39 The new law made them more subject
to reward and punishment, reassignment and direction, than they had previously been. While
these persons were still nominally in the civil service (that is, they were still permanent
employees), it is perhaps not surprising to learn that with the enlarged possibilities of reward and
discipline from above, practices of political clearance developed:
·

The White House office responsible for vetting appointments within government for,
inter alia, political acceptability grew from thirteen to twenty-one during the quarter
century between 1982, the second year of the Reagan administration, and 2008, during
the second term of the second Bush administration. The office peaked in 2001, the first
year of the second President Bush’s administration, with thirty-five employees. 40

39

The classic study of their work, written at about the time of this change, is H Kaufman, The

Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs (1981).
40

Compare Federal/State Executive Directory 1985 (Carroll Publishing Co 1985) with Carroll’s



·

A Department of Justice investigation found that Monica Goodling, the DOJ’s White
House Liaison and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, ‘improperly subjected
candidates for career positions [in the Justice Department] to the same politically based
evaluation she used on candidates for political positions, in violation of federal law and
department policy’. 41

Federal Directory 2008 (Carroll Publishing Co 2008).
41

US Department of Justice, ‘Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica

Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General’ (2008) 1, 135
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf> accessed 1 October 2009.
Similar implications arise from presidential reactions to congressional requirements of
relevant expertise for important policy positions. In the wake of the Katrina disaster and the
deficiencies in Federal Emergency Management Administration management it revealed,
Congress passed statutes requiring that the person appointed to head FEMA be a person
experienced in the management of complex institutions and disaster management. Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 s 611(11), 6 USC s 313. In a later statute, it
directed that appointees to high office in the United States Postal Commission have similar
experience-related backgrounds. Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 s 501, 39
USC s 202. In signing the lengthy statutes including these provisions into law, the President



·

Newspapers have reported that Vice President Cheney both attempted to control
decisions as slight as the amount of water having to be released from a federal dam to
protect threatened fish populations (in competition with the needs of farmers in a
drought-stricken region) and suggested the placement of White House political operatives
deep within agency bureaucracies. 42

·

A presidential executive order following quickly upon the Democratic Party’s winning
back control of Congress in 2006 essentially required every agency to place control over

identified these two provisions in particular, as against many he accepted, as unconstitutional
infringements of his authority to nominate or appoint anyone he chose. ‘Statement by President
George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 5441’ 2006 USCCAN S49, S52 (4 October 2006) (‘[the
statute] purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may
select the appointee in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by
experience and knowledge to fill the office. The executive branch shall construe [section 611] in
a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution’.); ‘Statement by
President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 6407’ (n 35 above), S76 (making an almost
identical statement).
42

Jo Becker and Barton Gellman, ‘Leaving No Tracks’ Washington Post (27 June 2007) A1,

2007 WLNR 12054552.



its rulemaking operations, not in the hands of the agency head, but a White House
appointee. 43
·

The administration of the second President Bush has been dogged throughout its length
with accusations of the political bending of science, 44 from refusals to permit government
analysts to testify concerning their results, to thumb-on-the-scales influence over
determinations ranging from the protection of an endangered whale species to the precise
level of ozone most appropriate for national air quality standards.

All of this, one might understand, is intimately connected with presidential claims to dominate,
as of right, the work of executive government – then turned not to administrative, but to political
ends.
This intense politicization of what had been imagined as expert, administrative processes is
from a certain perspective not surprising. It can be thought a consequence of legislative
43

Executive (Exec) Order No 13,422, 72 Fed Reg 2763 (23 January 2007). President Obama

repealed this measure as one of his first steps in office. Exec Order No 13,497, 74 Fed Reg 6113
(4 February 2009). For further discussion of Obama administration reforms, see text
accompanying nn 50-55 below.
44

TO McGarity and WE Wagner, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public

Health Research (2008).



irresponsibility in Congress, of the increasing practical importance of regulation to the American
economy (and hence to politicians), and of the American habit, common in recent decades, of
putting one political party in power in the White House and the other in power in Congress. For
Presidents facing a politically hostile Congress, the incentive – the need – to take active control
of the permanent government bureaucracy is clear. This imperative may seem all the more
compelling with respect to independent regulatory commissions, those agencies whose members
the President cannot discharge at will. 45
45

Even these commissions, however, are subject to considerable Presidential influence: in most

cases the Chair, who in turn has authority to appoint and remove inferior officers within the
agency, holds the post of Chair (though not the post of commissioner) at the pleasure of the
President. Additional leverage comes from the need of independent regulatory commissions,
like all agencies, for Presidential support on matters ranging from budget and legislation to
office space. ‘In sum, any assumption that executive agencies and independent regulatory
commissions differ significantly or systematically in function, internal or external procedures, or
relationships with the rest of government is misplaced’. Strauss (n 21 above) 596. Then again,
one can readily imagine the frustration of President Franklin Roosevelt, who once wrote to a
member of the Federal Trade Commission, ‘I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along
together on either the policies or the administering’ of the commission; when the commissioner



The difficulties, of course, are those suggested by Corwin, and by history’s experience with
over-powerful chief executives. Congress’s creation of power in discrete executive branch
bodies might not seem so threatening to civil liberties. Even though there is a democracy deficit
– such agencies are politically responsible only through their tie to presidential appointment –
these are dispersed authorities. Each agency acts in a delimited area of not only responsibility
but also technical expertise, and each exercises its limited authority using procedures that are
both transparent and subject to judicial oversight. 46 It is harder to accept the argument that the
power to decide all the manifold policy decisions Congress has committed to government
agencies lies in the hands of a single politician acting behind closed doors and, one may fear,
under the influence more of power politics than of expert judgment. Congress, after all, has
placed the responsibilities in the agencies, not the President, and made them subject (as he
ordinarily is not) to judicial as well as political controls.
What we are doing, then, is reframing the tension between the acceptance of rulemaking as a
constitutionally valid activity, and Justice Hugo Black’s famous remark (made in a context that

refused to resign, Roosevelt’s attempt to remove him was rebuffed by the Supreme Court.
Humphrey’s Exor v United States 295 US 602, 619; 55 S Ct 869, 870 (1935).
46

This argument is elegantly made in TD Rakoff, ‘The Shape of the Law in the American

Administrative State’ (1992) 11 Tel-Aviv U Studies in L 9.



had nothing to do with presidential direction of rulemaking, in his majority opinion for the Court
rejecting President Truman’s effort to claim an enlarged executive authority to deal with an
emergency of the Korean War) that ‘the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker’. 47 Our courts do accept agency
rulemaking, which is unmistakably lawmaking. They see agency decisions as agency, not
presidential, lawmaking. It is perhaps not difficult to see the challenges that the arguments for
such a strong ‘unitary executive’ pose to this accommodation.
Posing our problem as one of choosing between the rule of law or the rule of men
imagines the impossible. Even with the rule of law, we will at best have both. The question
is how we can keep the politics in check – and this is perhaps above all else an issue of
integrity. Three years ago, Neal Katyal published in the Yale Law Journal an essay entitled
‘Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within’.48
Faced with a broken Congress, he argued – and it is hard to doubt that Congress is broken –
the restraints of law on a President’s political ambition must come from within the Civil
Service.
47

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer 343 US 579, 587; 72 S Ct 863, 867 (1952).
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NK Katyal, ‘Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from

Within’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 2314.



Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy serves crucial
functions. It creates a civil service not beholden to any particular administration and
a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional world view.
Fans of ‘Yes, Minister’ will recognize this as not simply a possible American view.
Americans now have as President Barack Obama, who comes to that high office from a
career in the Senate – the first American President since Lyndon Johnson to have been
elected from a legislative, not executive office career. 49 Possibly the result will be an
interruption of what has seemed a steady flow of political authority in the United States into
the President’s hands. Some signs are encouraging in this regard: promptly upon taking
office, President Obama revoked 50 changes President George W. Bush had made to the
process by which the White House, acting through OIRA, oversees agency rulemaking; the
Bush-era changes had obscured the role of the Vice President, expanded the reach and
intensity of OIRA’s review, and required the designation in each agency of political officers
directly responsible to the President. Further, President Obama has proposed revamping the
OIRA review process and solicited public as well as agency views on the matter. 51 Also
49

Gerald Ford, too, came from the legislature, but was never elected.

50

Exec Order No 13,497 (n 43 above).

51

‘Regulatory Review: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies’ 74



worth noting is an effort by the new administration to prevent Presidential politicking from
usurping the role of science in agency decision-making: a March 2009 memorandum
charges the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the White House office
responsible for coordinating science matters in government, with developing suggestions to
produce merit-based (i.e., not political) appointments, use of scientific methods (including
peer review as appropriate) in developing information, heightened transparency, and
improved protection for dissidents (‘whistleblowers’). 52
On the other hand, it remains unclear exactly how much power President Obama actually
will relinquish. While he has restored OIRA to the role it played under President Clinton,
even that regime did not lack critics of its politicizing and delay-promoting possibilities.
Moreover, of the 183 submissions responding to President Obama’s invitation for
suggestions on further OIRA reform, not one is from a public agency; 53 this silence is

Fed Reg 5977 (3 February 2009); Office of Management and Budget, ‘Federal Regulatory
Review’ 74 Fed Reg 8819 (26 February 2009).
52

‘Scientific Integrity: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies’ 74

Fed Reg 10,671 (11 March 2009) (Scientific Integrity Memorandum).
53

Two meetings are mentioned, but in each case only the names of agency attendees are given.

See <http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp> accessed 10



striking, and may well indicate an instinct on the part of the Obama White House to control
executive branch communications at the expense of transparency. 54 Outside the OIRA
context, President Obama’s appointments to White House positions – for example, a former
EPA administrator, Carol Browner, to a new position as White House Coordinator of Energy
and Climate Policy – suggest that the scheme of multiple avenues of presidential control
described by Bressman and Vandendergh 55 persists. And while the new President’s calls for
reform with respect to OIRA and scientific integrity are laudable, it is yet to be seen what
reforms will follow.

September 2009.
54

In what may well be signs of the same tendency, President Obama has issued statements

capable of being read as consistent with previous regimes of strong White House control over
statements made by agencies, even to Congress. See Scientific Integrity Memorandum (n 52
above), s 3(b)(ii); Press Statement of 11 March 2009
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-on-the-signing-ofHR-1105/> accessed 13 March 2009. The latter statement exemplifies that President Obama has
continued use of Presidential signing statements, albeit at a slower pace than President Bush; see
nn 35 and 41 above.
55

See n 37 and accompanying text above.



The genius of our constitutional arrangements over the centuries has been their success in
preventing too much power to be placed in one pair of hands. The developments of recent
years have put that success at risk. Will the coming years see a restoration of reasonable
balance between bureaucratic/technical and political influences over governmental
policymaking? Ongoing crises of security and the economy will doubtless tempt our new
President to continue down his predecessors’ path. One may certainly hope he resists.



